Nationalism and Sectionalism - Document Overview Please read this document and answer the. Over the dozen years, from 1816 to 1828, that began with the election of James Monroe and ended with that of Andrew Jackson to the presidency, the American people reflected and acted upon such issues as national history, honor, and improvement. The revolutionary generation was dying off and a new cast of characters began to tread upon the nation's stage. As those who had played their parts bowed off into the wings, they tried to make sure that they would not be forgotten. Their endeavors were aided by transitional figures, such as Monroe and John Quincy Adams, who had entered adulthood during the Revolution and used the lessons of their youth first to support the leaders of the early Republic and then continue their work. Those arriving upon the stage applauded their predecessors even as they set about changing the setting, tempo, and temper of the play. The transition was both gross and subtle, marked by significant changes in characters and quieter modifications of costumeMonroe wore suits 'of somewhat antiquated fashion, with shoe-and-knee buckles' (as Adams recorded in 1821) at both of his inaugurations whereas most American men had begun to wear trousers, rather than buckled knee britches, even for formal events.
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Between 1816 and 1828 most of the remaining revolutionary leaders died: both Thomas Jefferson and John Adams died on 4 July 1826. Many of their compatriots also passed from the scene, but many others were still around, some in dire financial straits, to prick the nation's memory.
Congress responded by passing legislation to provide pensions for the soldiers of the Revolution. The young nation also commemorated its past by feting General Marie Joseph Lafayette on his visit to the states during 1824 and 1825 even as it celebrated its present by showing him how much the country had grown. The developing nation had indeed altered much, in form if not in substance. Americans had extended their country's borders and continued to stretch them. Within those borders, they argued over and then implemented internal improvements, such as roads and the development of waterways, to foster prosperity and power. While most, if not all, Americans looked at these transportation networks primarily as commercial necessities, a few leaders also saw them as contributing to the nation's securitythey could thus move the military more efficiently to meet threats posed by Indian tribes and foreign nations. As Native American resistance grew, so too did the response of the United States: the Seminoles and Andrew Jackson illustrated the dynamics of this aggression.
The nation was also intent on containing British imperial possessions to the north in Canada and pushing Spain off the continent altogether. Territorial and economic growth, especially when added to the self-congratulation that accompanied the end of the War of 1812, stimulated the growth of American nationalism. As the Federalist Party disappeared and Republicans adopted and adapted some of its ideas and projectsincluding a national bankas their own, some Americans could hope that political partisanship was a thing of the past.
That quickly proved to be wishful thinking, for one party could not accommodate all beliefs or all political players. Schisms developed within the party as its leaders jockeyed for power and the intense rivalry and deal-making that marked the election of Adams to the presidency in 1824 split the party. Andrew Jackson stormed out of its ranks and helped create the new Democratic Party, and then went on to win the election of 1828.
Schisms also developed between sections of the country. By this time the old North/South tensions had faded somewhat, but there was the rise of new North/South issues that were related to or exacerbated by the rise of the West. The question of Missouri statehood awakened people to the fact that the states had not surmounted all the domestic dangers to their union. The result was that even as citizens celebrated the nation's power, they started to worry about national dissolution. Sectional sentiments challenged nationalism, but the latter remained strong among the American people. Nationalism also prevailed due to the ideologies and actions of the country's leaders in the executive and judicial branches. Adams and Monroe secured the United States as a continental power and endeavored to extend it as a hemispheric one.
Although the United States was not a leading world power, Adams and Monroe were determined to maintain its national honor and autonomy. John Marshall, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was just as determined to preserve the power of the national government against encroachments from the states. Please answer the following questions. Madison, 1803 Please read this document and answer the. The Federalists lost Congress as well as the presidency in the elections of 1800, but before they handed over their seats and votes to the Jeffersonian Republicans, the Sixth Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801. Besides providing for a reduction in the number of Supreme Court justices, it also created sixteen circuit courts with a judge for each, and increased the number of attorneys, clerks, and marshals associated with the judicial branch.
Before leaving office, President Adams named John Marshall as chief justice and appointed a significant number of Federalists to the newly established positions. These last-minute commissions became known as the 'midnight appointments.' Unfortunately for some of those selected for the new offices, their commissions were not delivered before Jefferson took office. Jefferson, resisting the Federalist power play and trying to contain Federalist entrenchment in the judiciary, made a power play of his own by directing his secretary of state, James Madison, not to deliver the remaining commissions. When William Marbury did not receive his letter of appointment to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, he sued for a writ of mandamus (an order issued by a higher court to a lower one or to other government agencies and officials) to force its delivery. The Supreme Court, led by Marshall, in ruling on the case, not only exercised its own power but expanded it.
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court. At the last term, on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case, requiring the secretary of state to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia. No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus.
The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded. The first object of inquiry is, 1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? His right originates in an act of congress passed in February 1801, concerning the district of Columbia.
It appears from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a justice of peace for the county of Washington was signed by John Adams, then president of the United States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never reached the person for whom it was made out. In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed to the office. For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, became his property.
The second section of the second article of the constitution declares, 'the president shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.' The third section declares, that 'he shall commission all the officers of the United States.'
An act of congress directs the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United States, 'to make out and record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States to be appointed by the president, by and with the consent of the senate, or by the president alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have been signed by the president of the United States.' . The acts of appointing to office, and commissioning the person appointed, can scarcely be considered as one and the same; since the power to perform them is given in two separate and distinct sections of the constitution. It follows too, from the existence of this distinction, that, if an appointment was to be evidenced by any public act other than the commission, the performance of such public act would create the officer; and if he was not removable at the will of the president, would either give him a right to his commission, or enable him to perform the duties without it.
This is an appointment made by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and is evidenced by no act but the commission itself. In such a case therefore the commission and the appointment seem inseparable; it being almost impossible to show an appointment otherwise than by proving the existence of a commission: still the commission is not necessarily the appointment; though conclusive evidence of it. The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is prescribed by law, and not to be guided by the will of the president. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and is to record it. This is not a proceeding which may be varied, if the judgment of the executive shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued.It is the duty of the secretary of state to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the laws.
He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by the instructions of the president. It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary of state. Where an officer is removable at the will of the executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern; because the act is at any time revocable; and the commission may be arrested, if still in the office. But when the officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not revocable and cannot be annulled.
It has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed. The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him.
The right to the office is thenin the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right. This brings us to the second inquiry; which is, 2.
If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our country, it must arise from the peculiar character of the case. It behoves us then to inquire whether there be in its composition any ingredient which shall exempt from legal investigation, or exclude the injured party from legal redress. It follows then that the question, whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must always depend on the nature of that act. If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In some instances there may be difficulty in applying the rule to particular cases; but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty in laying down the rule. Where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
If this be the rule, let us inquire how it applies to the case under the consideration of the court. The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be exercised by the president according to his own discretion. When he has made an appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been completely applied to the case. If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the president, then a new appointment may be immediately made, and the rights of the officer are terminated. If the officer is by law not removable at the will of the president, the rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumable by the president.
It is then the opinion of the court,. That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president of the United States appointed him a justice of peace for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years. That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy. It remains to be inquired whether,.
He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on,. The nature of the writ applied for. And,. The power of this court.
The nature of the writ. This writ, if awarded, would be directed to an officer of government, and its mandate to him would be, to use the words of 'to do a particular thing therein specified, which appertains to his office and duty, and which the court has previously determined or at least supposes to be consonant to right and justice.' Or, in the words of Lord the applicant, in this case, has a right to execute an office of public concern, and is kept out of possession of that right.
These circumstances certainly concur in this case. Still, to render the mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is to be directed, must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may be directed: and the person applying for it must be without any other specific and legal remedy. With respect to the officer to whom it would be directed. The intimate political relation, subsisting between the president of the United States and the heads of departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of one of those high officers peculiarly irksome, as well as delicate:. It is not wonderful that in such a case as this, the assertion, by an individual, of his legal claims in a court of justice, to which claims it is the duty of that court to attend, should at first view be considered by some, as an attempt to intrude into the cabinet, and to intermeddle with the prerogatives of the executive. It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such a jurisdiction. The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. But, if this be not such a question; if so far from being an intrusion into the secrets of the cabinet, it respects a paper, which, according to law, is upon record,. If it be no intermeddling with a subject, over which the executive can be considered as having exercised any control; what is there in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim; or to issue a mandamus, directing the performance of a duty, not depending on executive discretion, but on particular acts of congress and the general principles of law?. This, then, is a plain case of a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be inquired, Whether it can issue from this court.
The act Judiciary Act of 1789 to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes via Section 13 the supreme court 'to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.' The secretary of state, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign. The constitution Article III vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States. In the distribution of this power it is declared that 'the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction.'
It has been insisted at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction to the supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause Section 2 assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction.
If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction made in the constitution, is form without substance. Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all. When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate: in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to the obvious meaning.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised. The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers.
It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limimit sic a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts and oblige them to give it effect? Fundamentals of corporate finance 6th edition solutions manual pdf ross. Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
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Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained. In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges.
And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey? There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject.
It is declared that 'no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.' Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? Ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law. 'No person,' says the constitution, 'shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.' Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from.
If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act? From these and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it?
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This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!. Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government?
If it is closed upon him and cannot be inspected by him. It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. The rule must be discharged.
The Americans Chapter 7 Quiz Chapter 7: Balancing Nationalism and Sectionalism Chapter 7 Quiz Ready to check your historical hunches? Test your knowledge by taking the The Americans interactive quiz for this chapter. Please do not use your browser's forward or backward buttons while taking this quiz. At any time, you can click the 'Restart' button to begin the quiz again. The push in the United States to industrialize was particularly pronounced in (A) Virginia (B) the South (C) New England (D) the mid-Atlantic states 2. Before the Civil War, agriculture in the South was (A) supported by manufacturing (B) concentrated on small farms (C) threatened by the cotton gin (D) dependent on slave labor 3.
The Missouri Compromise preserved the balance between (A) Britain and the U.S. (B) free and slave states (C) Federalists and Republicans (D) agriculture and manufacturing 4.
Jackson removed enemies and gave supporters political jobs under the (A) Tariff of Abominations (B) Monroe Doctrine (C) two-party system (D) spoils system 5. Jackson's attack on the national bank resulted in (A) the Whig Party (B) the BUS (C) pet bank failures (D) Jackson's re-election Copyright © 1995-2008 Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved., and.